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ABSTRACT
In online discussion communities, users can interact and share in-
formation and opinions on a wide variety of topics. However, some
users may create multiple identities, or sockpuppets, and engage
in undesired behavior by deceiving others or manipulating discus-
sions. In this work, we study sockpuppetry across nine discussion
communities, and show that sockpuppets differ from ordinary users
in terms of their posting behavior, linguistic traits, as well as social
network structure. Sockpuppets tend to start fewer discussions,
write shorter posts, use more personal pronouns such as “I”, and
have more clustered ego-networks. Further, pairs of sockpuppets
controlled by the same individual are more likely to interact on the
same discussion at the same time than pairs of ordinary users. Our
analysis suggests a taxonomy of deceptive behavior in discussion
communities. Pairs of sockpuppets can vary in their deceptiveness,
i.e., whether they pretend to be different users, or their supportive-
ness, i.e., if they support arguments of other sockpuppets controlled
by the same user. We apply these findings to a series of prediction
tasks, notably, to identify whether a pair of accounts belongs to
the same underlying user or not. Altogether, this work presents
a data-driven view of deception in online discussion communities
and paves the way towards the automatic detection of sockpuppets.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Discussions are a core mechanism through which people inter-
act with one another and exchange information, ideas, and opin-
ions. They take place on social networks such as Facebook, news
aggregation sites such as Reddit, as well as news websites such as
CNN.com. Nonetheless, the anonymity afforded by some discus-
sion platforms has led to some users deceiving others using multi-
ple accounts, or sockpuppets [13]. Sockpuppetry is often malicious
and deceptive, and has been used to manipulate public opinion [2,
38] and vandalize content (e.g., on Wikipedia [37]).
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Figure 1: AVClub.com social network. Nodes represent users
and edges connect users that reply to each other. Sockpuppets
(red nodes) tend to interact with other sockpuppets, and are
more central in the network than ordinary users (blue nodes).
Prior work on sockpuppetry and deceptive behavior has tended to
focus on individual motivations [9, 17], or on identifying sockpup-
pets through their linguistic traits [6] (e.g., on Wikipedia [37, 40]).
Further, given the difficulty of obtaining ground-truth data about
sockpuppets, work has also tended to make assumptions about how
sockpuppets behave, for example, assuming that they have simi-
lar usernames [26], they are only used to support one another [47],
or that they write similar to each other [6]. Further, research has
generally not considered how the interactions between sockpup-
pets controlled by the same individual could be used to accurately
and automatically identify sockpuppets. As such, improved meth-
ods for identifying sockpuppets, as well as deeper analyses of how
sockpuppets interact with one another may allow us to better un-
derstand, characterize, and automatically detect sockpuppetry.
The present work: Sockpuppetry in online discussion commu-
nities. In this paper, we focus on identifying, characterizing, and
predicting sockpuppetry in nine different online discussion com-
munities. We broadly define a sockpuppet as a user account that
is controlled by an individual (or puppetmaster) who controls at
least one other user account. By considering less easily manipu-
lated behavioral traces such as IP addresses and user session data,
we automatically identified 3,656 sockpuppets comprising 1,623
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sockpuppet groups, where a group of sockpuppets is controlled by
a single puppetmaster.
Studying these identified sockpuppets, we discover that sock-
puppets differ from ordinary users in terms of how they write and
interact with other sockpuppets. Sockpuppets have unique linguis-
tic traits, for example, using more singular first-person pronouns
(e.g., “I”), corroborating with prior work on deception [2]. They
also use fewer negation words, perhaps in an attempt to appear
more impartial, as well as fewer standard English parts-of-speech
such as verbs and conjunctions. Suggesting that sockpuppets write
worse than ordinary users on average, we find that posts are more
likely to be downvoted, reported by the community, and deleted by
moderators. Sockpuppets also start fewer discussions.
Examining pairs of sockpuppets controlled by the same puppet-
master, we find that sockpuppets are more likely to post at the same
time and post in the same discussion than random pairs of ordinary
users. As illustrated in Figure 1, by studying the network of user
replies, we find that sockpuppets have a higher pagerank and higher
local clustering coefficient than ordinary users, suggesting that they
are more important in the network and tend to generate more com-
munication between their neighbors. Further, we find that pairs
of sockpuppets write more similarly to each other than to ordinary
users, suggesting that puppetmasters tend not to have both “good”
and “bad” accounts.
While prior work characterizes sockpuppetry as malicious [37,
14, 40], not all the sockpuppets we identified were malicious. In
some sockpuppet groups, sockpuppets have display names signif-
icantly different from each other, but in other groups, they have
more similar display names. Our findings suggest a dichotomy in
how deceptive sockpuppets are – some are pretenders, that mas-
querade as separate users, while others are non-pretenders, that is
sockpuppets that are overtly visible to other members of the com-
munity. Pretenders tend to post in the same discussions and are
more likely to have their posts downvoted, reported, or deleted
compared to non-pretenders. In contrast, non-pretenders tend to
post in separate discussions, and write posts that are longer and
more readable.
Our analyses also suggest that sockpuppets may differ in their
supportiveness of each other. Pairs of sockpuppets controlled by
the same puppetmaster differ in whether they agree with each other
in a discussion. While sockpuppets in a pair mostly remain neutral
towards each other (or are non-supporters), 30% of the time, one
sockpuppet in a pair is used to support the other (or is a supporter),
while 10% of the time, one sockpuppet is used to attack the other
(or is a dissenter). Studying both deceptiveness and supportiveness,
we find that supporters also tend to be pretenders, but dissenters are
not more likely to be pretenders, suggesting that deceptiveness is
only important when sockpuppets are trying to create an illusion of
public consensus.
Finally, we show how our previous observations can be used to
develop models for automatically identifying sockpuppetry. We
demonstrate robust performance in differentiating pairs of sock-
puppets from pairs of ordinary users (ROC AUC=0.90), as well as
in the more difficult task of predicting whether an individual user
account is a sockpuppet (ROC AUC=0.68). We discover that the
strongest predictors of sockpuppetry relate to interactions between
the two sockpuppet accounts, as well as the interactions between
the sockpuppet and the community.
Altogether, our results begin to shed light on how sockpuppetry
occurs in practice, and paves the way towards the development and
maintenance of healthier online communities.
Community Genre # Users # Sockpuppets # Sock-groups
CNN News 846,436 1,191 523
Breitbart News 196,846 761 352
allkpop Music 159,671 445 193
MLB Sports 115,845 339 139
IGN Games 266,976 314 142
Fox News News 145,009 214 94
A.V. Club Entertainment 37,332 199 90
The Hill Politics 158,378 134 62
NPR News 65,662 59 28
Table 1: Statistics of the nine online discussion communities.
2. DATA AND DEFINITIONS
We start by laying out the terminology that we use in the remain-
der of the paper. We then describe the data we used in our analysis
and a robust method for automatically identifying sockpuppets.
Sockpuppetry. While in prior work sockpuppets have typically
been used to refer to a false online identity that is used for the pur-
poses of deceiving others [26, 47], we adopt a broader definition.
We define a sockpuppet as a user account controlled by an individ-
ual who has at least one other account. In other words, if an individ-
ual controls multiple user accounts, each account is a sockpuppet.
The individual who controls these sockpuppets is referred to as the
puppetmaster. We use the term sockpuppet group/pair to refer to
all the sockpuppets controlled by a single puppetmaster. In each
sockpuppet group, one sockpuppet typically has made significantly
more comments than the others – we refer to this sockpuppet as the
primary sockpuppet, and the other sockpuppets as secondary. Fi-
nally, we use ordinary user to refer to any user account that is not
a sockpuppet.
We study sockpuppets in the context of online discussion com-
munities. In these communities, people can create accounts to com-
ment on articles. In addition to writing or replying to posts, users
can also vote on posts or report them for abuse. Moderators can, in
turn, delete posts that do not conform to community standards. If a
post is not a reply to another post, we call that post a root post. We
define a discussion as all the posts that follow a given news article,
and a sub-discussion as a root post and any replies to that post.
Data. The data consists of nine different online discussion commu-
nities that encompass a variety of topical interests – from news and
politics to sports and entertainment (Table 1). Disqus, a comment-
ing platform that hosted these discussions, provided us with a com-
plete trace of user activity across nine communities that consisted
of 2,897,847 users, 2,129,355 discussions, and 62,744,175 posts.
Each user has a display name which appears next to their posts
and an email address which is private. (To respect user privacy, all
email addresses were stripped of the domain names and analyzed
in aggregate.) Each post is also associated with an anonymized IP
address of the posting user.
Identifying sockpuppets. No explicit labels of sockpuppets ex-
ist in any of the discussion communities, so to identify sockpup-
pets, we use multiple signals that together suggest that accounts
are likely to share the same owner – the IP address of a comment,
as well as the times at which comments are made, and the discus-
sions they post in. Our approach draws on the approach adopted
by Wikipedia administrators who identify sockpuppets by finding
accounts that make similar edits on the same Wikipedia article, in
near-similar time and from same IP address [1]. As we are primar-
ily interested in identifying sockpuppets with high precision, the
criteria we adopt is relatively conservative – relaxing these criteria
may improve recall, but at the cost of more false positives.
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Figure 2: Varying Kmin, the minimum number of overlapping
sessions between users for them to be identified as sockpuppets.
For sockpuppet pairs (blue) the time between posts, and the
difference in post lengths reach a minimum value at Kmin = 3.
To limit spurious detection of sockpuppets, we filter the data and
remove any IP addresses used by many user accounts, as these ac-
counts may simply be accessed from behind a country-wide proxy
or intranet. We also do not consider user accounts that post from
many different IP addresses, since they have high chance of shar-
ing IP address with other accounts. Specifically, for each discussion
community, we remove the top 5% most used IP addresses and the
top 5% accounts that have the most IP addresses.
Then, we identify sockpuppets as user accounts that post from
the same IP address in the same discussion within T minutes for
at least Kmin different discussions. Here, we set T = 15 minutes
(larger values result in empirically similar findings). To pick an
appropriate value for Kmin, we use two metrics that prior work has
found indicative of sockpuppets: the time difference between posts
made by two accounts, and the difference in the length of posts [6,
40, 20, 33].
Figure 2 plots these quantities for identified pairs of sockpuppets
as well as random pairs of users. We observe that regardless of
the value of Kmin, the identified sockpuppets post more closely in
time and write posts more similar in length, compared to a random
pair of users. Further, we find that among sockpuppet pairs, these
quantities achieve their minimum at Kmin = 3, which means that
sockpuppets are most reliably identified at that value of Kmin.
To summarize, we define sockpuppets as user accounts that post
from the same IP address in the same discussion in close tempo-
ral proximity at least 3 times. We then define sockpuppet groups
as maximal sets of accounts such that each account satisfies the
above definition with at least one other account in the group. Over-
all, we identify a total of 1,623 sockpuppet groups, consisting of
3,656 sockpuppets from nine different online discussion communi-
ties (Table 1). As most sockpuppet groups contain two sockpuppets
(Figure 3(a)), we focus our analyses on pairs of sockpuppets.
We give an example of an identified sockpuppet group below,
which consists of three users: S1 and S2 comprise a pair of sock-
puppets, while O is an ordinary user. After an unusually positive
interaction between the two sockpuppets, O identifies them as be-
ing controlled by the same puppetmaster:
S1: Possibly the best blog I’ve ever read major props
to you.
↪→ S2: Thanks. I knew Marvel fans would try to flame
me, but they have nothing other than “oh that’s your
opinion” instead of coming up with their own argu-
ment.
↪→ O: Quit talking to yourself, *******. Get back on
your meds if you’re going to do that.
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Figure 3: (a) Number of sockpuppet groups, i.e. sockpuppets
belonging to the same puppetmaster. (b) The second sockpup-
pet in a group tends to be created shortly after the first.
Figure 4: Two hypotheses how similarity of sockpuppet pairs
and ordinary users relates to each other. Top: Under the double
life hypothesis, sockpuppet S1 is similar to an ordinary user O,
while S2 deviates. Bottom: Alternative hypothesis is that both
sockpuppet accounts are highly different from ordinary users.
3. CHARACTERIZING SOCKPUPPETRY
Having identified sockpuppets, we now turn to characterizing
their behavior. We study when sockpuppets are created and how
their language and social networks differ from ordinary users across
all nine discussion communities.
Sockpuppets are created early. To understand when sockpuppets
are created, we examine the activity of the first sockpuppet account
in each sockpuppet pair. Figure 3(b) shows the fraction of total
number of posts made by the first sockpuppet before the second
sockpuppet is created. The second sockpuppet tends to be created
during the first 10% of the posts, with a median of 18% posts writ-
ten by first sockpuppet before the second sockpuppet begins post-
ing. In other words, sockpuppets tend to be created early in a user’s
lifetime, which may indicate that sockpuppet creation is premedi-
tated and not a result of user’s interactions in the community.
Matching sockpuppets with ordinary users. On average, sock-
puppets write more posts than ordinary users (699 vs. 19) and par-
ticipate in more discussions (141 vs. 7). To control for this dispar-
ity, in all our subsequent analyses we use propensity score match-
ing [34] to match sockpuppets with ordinary users that have similar
numbers of posts and make posts to the same set of discussions.
3.1 Do puppetmasters lead double lives?
First, we explore an important question about how the behavior
of sockpuppets S1 and S2 controlled by the same puppetmaster re-
lates to that of an ordinary user O. Two possible hypotheses are
illustrated in Figure 4. First is the double life hypothesis, where
the puppetmaster maintains a distinct personality for each sock-
puppet – one sockpuppet, S1, behaves like an ordinary user, while
the other, S2 behaves more maliciously. Under this hypothesis we
would expect that the linguistic similarity of posts written by O and
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Figure 5: Difference in properties of sockpuppet pairs and that of sockpuppet-ordinary pairs. Sockpuppet pairs are more similar to
each other in several linguistic attributes.
S1 would be high, and that between both S1 and S2, as well as O
and S2 to be significantly lower. In the alternative hypothesis (Fig-
ure 4 (bottom)), both sockpuppets act maliciously. In this case, we
might expect that the linguistic similarity between S1 and S2 would
be low, but that between S1 and O, and S2 and O to be much lower.
To find out which is the case, we compare the language of pairs
of sockpuppets, and that of each sockpuppet with an ordinary user.
To control for user activity, we again match sockpuppets with ordi-
nary users that have similar posting activity, and that participate in
similar discussions. Specifically, for each user, we created a feature
vector consisting of several linguistic features computed from that
user’s posts, including LIWC categories and sentiment, the average
number of words in a post, the average fraction of special charac-
ters. We then compute the cosine similarity of the feature vectors.
We find that on average, the two sockpuppets are more similar to
each other than either is to an ordinary user (p < 0.001). Figure 5
highlights that these observations hold for individual features as
well – the difference between two sockpuppets’ readability score
(ARI), average word length, number of function words, personal
pronouns and assent words are smaller than that of either sockpup-
pet and an ordinary user. This suggests that the double life hy-
pothesis (Figure 4(top)) is less likely to be true than the alternate
hypothesis (Figure 4(bottom)).
In other words, this experiment suggests that puppetmasters do
not lead double lives, and that it is generally not the case that in-
dividual sockpuppets controlled by the same puppetmaster behave
differently. Rather, sockpuppets as a whole tend to write differ-
ently from ordinary users, and sockpuppets controlled by the same
puppetmaster all tend to write similarly to each other.
3.2 Linguistic Traits of Sockpuppets
Having established that different sockpuppets controlled by the
same puppetmaster behave consistently, we now turn our attention
to quantify their linguistic traits more precisely. Here, we focus
on comparing various measures of similarity sim(Si,O) of a sock-
puppet Si (i= {1,2}) and a matched ordinary user O. Specifically,
we use LIWC word categories [31] to measure the fraction of each
type of words written in all posts, and VADER [18] to measure sen-
timent of posts. We report the average values for sockpuppets and
the corresponding p-values by performing paired t-tests for each
sockpuppet and its matching ordinary user.
Do sockpuppets write differently from ordinary users? Lin-
guistic traits have been used to identify trolls in discussions [11],
vandalism on Wikipedia [32], and fake reviewers on e-commerce
platforms [27]. For example, deceptive authors tend to increase
their usage of function words, particles and personal pronouns [2,
5]. They use more first- and second-person singular personal pro-
nouns (e.g., ‘I’, ‘you’), while reducing their use of third-person
singular personal pronouns (e.g., ‘his’, ‘her’). They also tend to
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Figure 6: (a) Histogram for the most active topic for each sock-
puppet account. (b) In a sockpuppet group, the secondary sock-
puppets tend to be used alongside the primary sockpuppet.
oversimplify their writing style by writing shorter sentences and
writing words with fewer syllables.
We make similar observations with respect to sockpuppets. First,
we observe that they tend to write posts that are more self-centered
– and use “I” more often than ordinary users (0.076 for sockpup-
pets vs 0.074 for ordinary users, p<0.001). Sockpuppets also use
“you” more often (0.017 vs 0.015, p<0.01) but third-person sin-
gular personal pronouns and plural personal pronouns (i.e., ‘we’,
‘he’, ‘she’, and ‘they’) less (e.g. 0.016 vs 0.018 for ‘he/she’ words,
p < 0.001), indicating that they tend to address other users in the
community more directly. Similarly, we observe that sockpuppets
also write shorter sentences than ordinary users (a mean of 12.4 vs.
12.9 words per sentence, p < 0.001). However, in contrast to prior
work on deceptive writing, sockpuppets use a similar number of
syllables per word (1.29 vs 1.28, p = 0.35).
Turning to differences in LIWC categories, we observe that sock-
puppets also appear to write worse than ordinary users. They are
more likely to swear (0.003 vs 0.002, p < 0.05) and use more punc-
tuation (0.057 vs 0.055, p < 0.05), while using fewer alphabetic
characters (0.769 vs 0.771, p < 0.05). Sockpuppets also use fewer
standard English parts-of-speech, such as articles, verbs, adverbs
and conjuctions (e.g. for articles, 0.062 vs 0.064, p < 0.001). How-
ever, while trolls wrote posts that were less readable [11], sock-
puppets write posts with similar readability (automated readability
index, or ARI = 11.24 vs 11.41 of ordinary users, p=0.09). Sock-
puppets also tend to agree more in their posts (0.002 vs -0.012, p
< 0.05), possibly to minimize conflict with others and support their
other sockpuppet account. They also express less negative senti-
ment (0.022 vs 0.023, p < 0.001), though their overal sentiment,
subtracting negative from positive sentiment, is similar to that of
ordinary users (0.030 vs 0.028, p = 0.43).
3.3 Activity and Interactions
Next, we study how sockpuppets interact with the community at
large, and how it responds to these sockpuppets.
Sockpuppets start fewer discussions, and post more in exist-
ing discussions. First, we note that sockpuppets start fewer dis-
cussions, but rather post more within existing discussions (65% of
sockpuppets’ posts are replies compared to 51% for ordinary users,
p < 0.001). This shows that sockpuppets are mainly used to reply
to other users.
Sockpuppets tend to participate in discussions with more con-
troversial topics. Do sockpuppets create accounts to participate in
certain topics? To answer this, we look at the topics of the discus-
sions in CNN on which sockpuppets post. As shown in Figure 6(a)
topics that tend to attract more controversy such as usa, world, pol-
itics, justice and opinion, also attract the majority of sockpuppets,
while other topics such as health and showbiz have comparatively
fewer sockpuppets. This indicates that one of the main motivations
for using sockpuppets is to use them to build support for a particular
position, corroborating prior work [6, 47].
Sockpuppets are treated harshly by the community. A com-
munity can provide feedback to a sockpuppet in three ways: other
users can vote on or report their posts, and moderators can delete
the posts. Comparing the posts made by sockpuppets with those
made by ordinary users, we find that sockpuppets’ posts receive a
greater fraction of downvotes (0.51 vs 0.43, p < 0.001), are reported
more often (0.05 vs 0.026, p < 0.001) and are also deleted more
often (0.11 vs 0.08, p < 0.001). Moreover, sockpuppets are also
blocked by the moderators more often (0.09 vs 0.07, p < 0.001).
Overall, this suggests that sockpuppets are making undesirable com-
ments.
Sockpuppets in a pair interact with each other more. Pairs
of sockpuppets also tend to post together in more sub-discussions
compared to random pairs of ordinary users (6.57 vs 0.33, p <
0.001). Moreover, looking at when posts are made, pair of sock-
puppets also post more frequently on the same discussion within
15 minutes of each other (7.8 vs 4.28, p < 0.001). In other words,
pairs of sockpuppets are significantly more likely to interact with
one another, and post at the same time, than two ordinary users
would.
Sockpuppets in a pair upvote each other more. Looking at votes,
pairs of sockpuppets vote significantly more often on each other’s
posts than random pairs of ordinary users (9.35 vs 0.40 votes, p
< 0.001). Among the two sockpuppets in a pair, the secondary
sockpuppet votes more on primary sockpuppet’s posts than vice-
versa (14.2 vs 4.5 votes, p < 0.01). Moreover, pair of sockpuppets
largely give positive votes to each other as compared to ordinary
users (0.987 vs 0.952; p < 0.05). Altogether, sockpuppets in a pair
use their votes to significantly inflate one another’s ‘popularity’.
Secondary sockpuppets are used in conjunction with primary
sockpuppets. Puppetmasters, while controlling multiple sockpup-
pets, may either use multiple sockpuppets at the same time, or dif-
ferent sockpuppets at different times. To quantify how a puppet-
master may switch between using different sockpuppets, we com-
pute the fraction of consecutive posts made by a particular sock-
puppet, and then compute the entropy of this distribution. This way
we quantify how much intertwined is the usage of both sockpup-
pet accounts. For instance, consider two sockpuppets controlled by
the same puppetmaster. The puppetmaster first uses S1 to write 5
posts, then uses S2 to write 1 post, switches back to S1 to write
4 more posts, and then finally switches back to S2 to write 1 more
post. The entropy of this post sequence for S1 is− 59 log 59− 49 log 49 ,
while that for S2 is − 12 log 12 − 12 log 12 .
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Figure 7: Comparison of egonetwork of sockpuppets and sim-
ilar random users in the reply network.
Thus, a lower entropy signifies that a particular sockpuppet is
not being used at the same time as the other sockpuppet, while
higher entropy indicates that that sockpuppet is being used at the
same time as another sockpuppet, with the puppetmaster constantly
switching between the two.
Figure 6(b) shows the entropy of the primary and the secondary
sockpuppets in a sockpuppet pair. We find that secondary accounts
tend to have higher entropy, meaning that these sockpuppets are
more likely to be used in conjunction with the primary sockpup-
pet, and thus may be used to support the primary account (e.g., in
writing supportive replies). In contrast, primary sockpuppets have
lower entropy, meaning they tend to be used more exclusively.
3.4 Reply network structure
Last, we examine the user-user interaction network of the en-
tire discussion community. To do this, we create a reply network,
where a node represents a user and an edge from node A to node
B indicates that A replied to B’s post at least once. Figure 1 shows
the reply network of The AV Club discussion community, with red
nodes denoting the sockpuppets and blue nodes denoting ordinary
accounts. Here, we observe that the nodes denoting sockpuppets
are more central in the network. In particular, we find that sock-
puppets tend to have higher pagerank than ordinary users (2×10−4
vs 1×10−6, p < 0.001).
To further understand the differences in how the sockpuppets in-
teract with other users, we additionally compare the ego network of
sockpuppets with that of ordinary users (Figure 7). We observe that
both the number of nodes, and density of the ego networks of sock-
puppets and ordinary users are similar (291.5 vs. 291.3 nodes, p =
0.97, and densities of 0.24 vs. 0.22, p < 0.01). However, the ego
networks of sockpuppets are more tightly knit, as measured by the
average clustering coefficient (Figure 7(a), 0.52 vs 0.49, p < 0.001).
The nodes in a sockpuppet’s ego network reply more to their neigh-
bors, as measured by the average reciprocity (Figure 7(b), 0.48 vs
0.45, p < 0.001) with sockpuppets generally initiating more inter-
actions (that is, they reply to more users than the users that reply to
it, Figure 7(c), 0.51 vs 0.46, p < 0.001). These observations sug-
gest that sockpuppets are highly active in their local network, and
also generate more activity among the other users.
4. TYPES OF SOCKPUPPETRY
Different types of sockpuppets exist, and their characteristics
suggest that they may serve different purposes. Here, in contrast to
prior work which assumes that sockpuppets usually pretend to be
other users [37, 14, 40], we find that sockpuppets can differ in their
deceptiveness – while many sockpuppets do pretend to be different
users, a significant number do not. When sockpuppets participate
in the same discussions, they may also differ in their supportive-
ness – sockpuppets may be used to support other sockpuppets of
the same puppetmaster, while others may choose not to.
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Figure 8: Differences between pretenders and non-pretenders: (a) fraction of upvotes, (b) fraction of special characters in posts, (c)
number of characters per sentence, (d) average sentiment, (e) usage of first person pronoun (“I”).
Sockpuppets Ordinary
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
L
ev
en
sh
te
in
di
st
an
ce
be
tw
ee
n
di
sp
la
y
na
m
es
(a)
Sockpuppets Ordinary
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
L
ev
en
sh
te
in
di
st
an
ce
be
tw
ee
n
em
ai
la
dd
re
ss
es
(b)
0 5 10 15 20
Levenshtein Distance between display names
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
N
um
be
r
of
pa
ir
s
Sock pairs Random pairs
(c)
Figure 9: The (a) display names and (b) email addresses of the
sockpuppet accounts are more similar to each other compared
to similar random pairs. (c) Based on the distance of display
names, sockpuppets can be pretenders (high distance) or non-
pretenders (low distance).
4.1 Deceptiveness: Pretenders vs. non-pretenders
A pair of sockpuppets can pretend to be two separate individu-
als, or may simply be two user accounts an individual uses in dif-
ferent contexts, without any masquerading. We refer to the former
group of sockpuppets as pretenders, and the latter group as non-
pretenders.
One way we might quantify the deceptiveness of a sockpuppet
pair is to examine the similarity of display names and email ad-
dresses (we only examine the part of the email address before the
@-sign). Display names are public and show up next to user’s com-
ments, while email addresses are private and only visible to forum
administrators. If a pair of sockpuppets wants to appear as two sep-
arate users, each may adopt a display name that is substantially dif-
ferent from the other in order to deceive community members. Pup-
petmaster may also adopt significantly different email addresses to
avoid detection by system administrators. To quantify this differ-
ence, we measure the Levenshtein distance between two display
names, as well as the corresponding email addresses.
Figures 9(a) and 9(b) compare how display names and email ad-
dresses differ between pairs of sockpuppets, and between random
pairs of ordinary users. We observe that sockpuppets pairs have
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Figure 10: (a) Based on the fraction of common discussions be-
tween sockpuppet pairs, there are two types of sockpuppets:
independent, which rarely post on same discussion, and sock-
only, which only post on same discussions. (b) Increase is dis-
play name distance is highly correlated with discussion use.
both more similar display names as well as email addresses than
what would be expected by comparing random pairs of users. This
also serves as evidence that sockpuppets we identified are likely to
have been created by the same individual. Further, we also observe
that email addresses of sockpuppets are 50% more similar than
those of ordinary accounts, while display names of sockpuppets are
only 25% more similar than expected at random. This observation
may be explained by the fact that sockpuppets put more effort into
picking unique display names, which are public-facing, and less ef-
fort into picking unique email addresses, which are private-facing
and less likely to be noticed.
But are all sockpuppets simply more likely to have more sim-
ilar display names? Examining the distribution of the distances
between display names in Figure 9(c), we find that the distribution
for random pairs is unimodal, while for sockpuppets it is bimodal.
This bimodality suggests that two types of sockpuppets pairs ex-
ist. The first type of sockpuppets has virtually identical display
names (Levenshtein distance < 5), and these are what we call non-
pretenders. The second type of sockpuppets has substantially dif-
ferent display names (Levenshtein distance ≥5), and we call them
pretenders. Pretenders are likely to be created for deception and
use different display names to avoid detection. Non-pretenders on
the other hand have similar display names and this may implicitly
signal to the community that they are controlled by the same indi-
vidual, and thus may be less likely to be malicious.
Across all communities, we find 947 pretender and 403 non-
pretender sockpuppet groups. We observe that pretenders tend to
participate in the same discussions. For example, Figure 10(a) plots
the fraction of common discussions over all sockpuppet groups. We
observe bimodality here as well, which may be partially explained
by the bimodality of the distribution of display name distances –
Figure 10(b) shows that the likelihood of a pair of sockpuppets par-
ticipating in the same discussion increases as their display names
become more different (fitted regression line shown in solid for
clarity). In other words, these observations suggest that sockpup-
pets that participate in many common discussions have very dif-
ferent display names (high Levenshtein distance) and are thus pre-
tenders, while accounts that participate in few common discussions
tend to have similar display names and are thus non-pretenders.
Figure 8 additionally illustrates the other differences of pretenders
and non-pretenders. We find that pretenders’ posts are both more
likely to be reported (0.06 fraction of all pretenders’ posts are re-
ported vs 0.03 for non-pretenders, p < 0.001 ), be deleted by mod-
erators (0.11 vs 0.08, p < 0.001), and receive a smaller fraction
of up-votes (0.45 vs 0.53, p < 0.001). Pretenders also write posts
that contain more uppercase (0.07 vs 0.05, p < 0.001) and special
characters (0.06 vs 0.05, p < 0.001), which suggests both shouting,
as well as swearing. In contrast, non-pretenders wrote posts which
were longer (35.2 words vs 38.6, p < 0.05) and more readable (ARI
11.15 vs 11.58, p < 0.05). Pretenders’ posts also contained more
positive sentiment (0.04 vs 0.013, p < 0.001) and agreement words
(0.006 vs 0.005, p < 0.001), suggesting that they tended to be more
affable.
4.2 Supporters vs. Dissenters
Prior work suggests that a primary purpose of sockpuppets is to
sway public opinion by creating consensus [35]. Thus, we focus
our attention on sockpuppets participating in the same discussion,
and examine how they interact with each other – do sockpuppets
tend to support each other?
We study two ways in which a sockpuppet pair (S1,S2) may in-
teract – directly, where one sockpuppet (S2) replies to another sock-
puppet (S1), or indirectly, where one sockpuppet (S2) replies to a
third user (O) who had replied to the first sockpuppet (S1).
We focus on the extent to which sockpuppet S2 agrees with sock-
puppet S1, and measure agreement as the difference between frac-
tion of words categorized by LIWC as assenting and those catego-
rized as either negations or dissenting [45]. We additionally adjust
the sign of agreement depending on who the replying sockpuppet is
replying to. For example, S2 may write a post disagreeing with an
ordinary user O. But if that ordinary user O in turn disagreed with
the initial sockpuppet S1, then we assume that the replying sock-
puppet S2 is instead in agreement with the initial sockpuppet S1.
We divide sockpuppets into three groups – supporters, who have a
positive agreement score, non-supporters, who have an agreement
score of zero, and dissenters, who have a negative agreement score.
Across all communities, we find that 60% of the sockpuppets are
non-supporters, while 30% are supporters. Only 10% of sockpup-
pets are dissenters. Examining these discussions, we find evidence
that supporters tend to support the arguments of S1 (e.g., ‘I agree, or
‘so true’), and sometimes make additional arguments in their favor
(e.g., ‘That will cost him the election [...]’).
On the other hand, dissenters tend to argue against S1 (e.g., ‘That’s
not what you said [...]’). We hypothesize that one reason sockpup-
pets may disagree with each other, despite being controlled by the
same puppetmaster, may simply be to attract more attention to the
argument. In some cases, we observed a dissenter making easily
refutable arguments (e.g., ‘Ok if your [sic] so worried about being
spied Throw away all your electronics.’), which may have served
to discredit the opposing view.
Altogether, these observations suggest that within discussions,
sockpuppets may adopt different roles. While most sockpuppets
argue for other sockpuppets controlled by the same puppetmaster,
a small but significant number instead argue against other sockpup-
pets instead.
Nonetheless, is there a relationship between deceptiveness and
supportiveness? Figure 2 shows that overall, users who support
Pretender Non-pretender
Supporter 0.74 0.26
Non-supporter 0.70 0.30
Dissenter 0.58 0.42
Table 2: 74% of supporters, 70% of non-supporters and 58%
of dissenters are pretenders.
Feature Set Features
Activity Reply egonetwork clustering coefficient and reciprocity,
Number of posts, proportion of reply posts,
Time between posts, tenure time
Community Whether account is blocked, fraction of upvotes,
Fraction of reported and deleted posts
Post Number of characters, syllables, words, sentences,
Fraction of punctuations, uppercase characters, etc.,
Number of syllables per word, words per sentences, etc.
Readability metrics (e.g. ARI), LIWC (e.g. swear words),
Agreement, sentiment and emotion strength
Table 3: Three sets of features were used to identify sockpup-
pets and sockpuppet pairs.
other users in discussions are most likely to be also pretending to
be other users (74% of supporters are pretenders). Interestingly,
when users dissent in a discussion, they are less likely to be a pre-
tender. This suggests that pretending is most important when a
puppetmaster is trying to create an illusion of consensus.
5. DETECTING SOCKPUPPETS
Our previous analysis found that sockpuppets generally contribute
worse content and engage in deceptive behavior. Thus, it would be
useful to create automated tools that can help identify sockpuppets,
and assist moderators in policing online communities. In this sec-
tion, we consider two classification tasks, both of which relate to
the prediction of sockpuppetry. First, can we distinguish sockpup-
pets from ordinary users? And second, can we identify pairs of
sockpuppets in the communities?
Based on the observations and findings from the analyses in the
previous sections, we identify three sets of features that may help in
finding sockpuppets and sockpuppet pairs: activity features, com-
munity features, and post features. For each userU , we develop the
following features:
Activity features: This set of features is derived from U’s post-
ing activity. Prior research has shown that activity behavior of bots,
spammers, and vandals is different from that of benign users [10,
24, 25, 12, 40]. Moreover, in our analysis, we have seen that
sockpuppets make more posts and they start less sub-discussions.
Therefore, the activity features we consider include the number of
posts, the proportion of posts that are replies, the mean time be-
tween two consecutive posts, and U’s site tenure, or the number of
days from U’s first post. Further, we use features based on how U
is situated in the reply network. Here,U’s local network consists of
U , the users whose posts U replied to, and the users that replied to
U’s posts. We then consider clustering coefficient and reciprocity
of this network. In addition, for the task of identifying pairs of
sockpuppets, we use number of common sub-discussions between
these sockpuppets to measure how often the two comment together.
Community features: Interactions between a user and the rest
of the community may also be indicative of sockpuppetry. Commu-
nity feedback on an account’s posts has been effective in identifying
trolls and cheaters [11, 4], and we also observed that sockpuppets
are treated more harshly than ordinary users. Thus, we consider the
fraction of downvotes on posts U wrote, as well as the fraction that
were reported or deleted, in addition to whether U was blocked.
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Figure 11: Classification performance to identify (a) sockpup-
pets from ordinary users and (b) pairs of sockpuppet accounts
(bottom). Activity features have the highest performance.
Post features: Finally, we also measure the linguistic features of
U’s posts. These features have been very effective to identify sock-
puppets [37, 6], authors of text [3, 20], deceptive writing styles [2],
trolls [11], hoaxes [25], and vandalism [32]. In our analysis, we
observe that sockpuppets do indeed write differently, for example,
writing shorter sentences, using more swear words, and using more
singular first-person pronouns. Thus, we incorporate linguistic fea-
tures such as the number of characters, average word length, av-
erage number of syllables in words, number of big sentences, text
readability (measured using ARI), and the different categories of
LIWC features. Finally, we also consider sentiment, emotional va-
lence, and agreement (as described previously).
5.1 Is an account a sockpuppet?
Given the posts a user has made, is it possible to distinguish a
sockpuppet from an ordinary user? To control for user activity,
we match sockpuppets and ordinary users on their total number of
posts, as well as the discussions they post in. Matching gives a
balanced dataset, where random guessing results in 50% accuracy.
We perform 10-fold cross validation using a random forest classi-
fier, then measure performance using ROC AUC.
Figure 11(a) shows results obtained individually with each fea-
ture set, as well as when considering all the features together. We
observe that when using all features, the AUC is 0.68. Individu-
ally, all three feature sets perform similarly, with activity features
slightly more predictive than the others (AUC=0.59).
To find the relative advantage of adding features, we perform for-
ward feature selection. We observe that activity and post features
perform close to the final AUC of 0.68, and that there is not much
lift by adding the community features. This means that to identify
sockpuppets, their activity and content of the post matter the most.
5.2 Are two accounts sockpuppet pairs?
Next, we turn our attention to identifying pairs of sockpuppets.
Given a sockpuppet and two other users, where one is a sockpuppet,
can we predict which user is the sockpuppet?
For each sockpuppet pair (S1,S2), we choose a matching ordi-
nary account O for sockpuppet S1. Again, this results in a balanced
dataset and the task is to identify which of these two pairs is a sock-
puppet. Features used in this experiment are the differences in the
individual feature values for the two accounts each pair. We again
evaluate performance using a random forest classifier.
Figure 11(b) shows the performance of the resulting classifier.
We achieve a very high AUC of 0.91, suggesting that the inter-
actions between sockpuppets are strongly predictive. Looking at
the individual features, we see that activity features again perform
the best, with close to 0.86 AUC. Community features perform the
poorest, with an AUC of 0.56.
Overall, our results suggest that activity-based features best pre-
dict sockpuppetry. While it is possible to differentiate sockpuppets
from ordinary users, it is significantly easier to find other sockpup-
pets in the same group once at one sockpuppet has been identi-
fied. The latter result suggests most importantly, the interactions
between sockpuppets are the best way to identify them.
6. RELATED WORK
Our findings build on a rich vein of prior work in both deception
and author identification.
Deception detection Sockpuppetry is situated in the broader field
of deception. Deception online is aided by the virtue of anonymity [13].
It can occur as deceptive content as well as a deceptive agent [41].
The behavior of people changes when they deceive, for example,
they reduce communication [48] and change the focus of their pre-
sentation [39]. When writing deceptively to hide their identity, au-
thors tend to increase use of particles and personal pronouns, write
shorter sentences, and show nervousness [2, 5, 22, 8]. Our work
adds to this line of research by finding evidence of deceptive writ-
ing styles and presentation by sockpuppets – pretender sockpuppets
may pretend to be different people by using different display names
and they tend to write deceptively as well.
Motivations for sockpuppetry Turning to research that studies
sockpuppetry specifically, one line of work has studied their mo-
tivations. Sockpuppetry is often used to avoid being banned, to
create false consensus [38, 2] and support a person or a position
[9], or vandalize content (e.g. on Wikipedia [37]). Relatedly, mo-
tivations for multiple account creation in online multiplayer games
can either be benign (e.g. experimentation with different identities)
or malicious (e.g. increasing in-game profit, cheating) [15, 16, 23,
9]. In our work, we find evidence for these motivations – sockpup-
pets in discussion communities sometimes support each other, and
beyond malicious uses, some uses of sockpuppetry may be benign
(e.g. a user may simply use different accounts to post in different
topics).
Sockpuppetry and author identification Another line of work has
also identified sockpuppets using textual information, link analysis
and temporal information, both in online discussion forums [6, 47]
and social networks [14, 26, 47, 43]. However, definitions of sock-
puppets from previous research have tended to make assumptions
about the usernames that sockpuppets use (e.g., that they are similar
[26]), their opinion towards topics (e.g., they have the same opinion
[6]), and their interactions (e.g., that they reply in support of each
other’s posts [47]). As such, these definitions tend to miss several
types of sockpuppetry. In this work, we developed a robust method-
ology for identifying sockpuppets that makes fewer assumptions,
and showed that a significant fraction of sockpuppets do use differ-
ent names (i.e., the non-pretenders), and tend not to support each
other in discussions (i.e., the non-supporters).
Sockpuppetry on Wikipedia has been studied extensively due to
availability of manually-validated ground-truth data [37, 40, 44,
30]. However, in contrast to sockpuppetry in discussion communi-
ties, which is the focus of our work, sockpuppet editors on Wikipedia
primarily edit articles, and the main purpose is not to interact with
each other.
Closely related to sockpuppet detection is author identification,
or the task of identifying the original author of a document [20,
21, 28, 29, 30, 33]. More recently, research has used multiple ac-
counts of users across different social platforms to identify mali-
cious users [42], and to identify accounts operated by the same
user across different web platforms [19, 36, 46, 47]. In contrast to
our work here, this line of research does not operate under the as-
sumption of deception and thus may be less applicable to situations
when authors try to obfuscate their writing [2, 5].
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our findings shed light on how sockpuppets are used in practice
in online discussion communities. By developing a robust method-
ology for identifying sockpuppets, we are able to comprehensively
study their activity. Importantly, this methodology is able to iden-
tify sockpuppets that were created at significantly different times,
use very different usernames or email addresses, write differently,
or mostly post in different discussions.
Our work revealed differences in how sockpuppets write and be-
have in online communities. Sockpuppets use more singular first-
person pronouns, write shorter sentences, and swear more. They
participate in discussions with more controversial topics, and are
especially likely to interact with other sockpuppets. These differ-
ences allowed us to build preditive models that robustly differen-
tiate pairs of sockpuppets from ordinary users, as well as identify
individual user accounts that are sockpuppets.
Nonetheless, our analysis has limitations that would be interest-
ing to explore in future work. First, using our heuristics, we are not
able to identify sockpuppets that are also throwaway accounts and
are only used once before being abandoned. Next, we studied sock-
puppetry in discussion forums where users are pseudonymous. It
would be interesting to study the effect of using real identities (e.g.,
Facebook), or in completely anonymous settings (e.g., 4chan). We
also primarily studied pairs of sockpuppets, but understanding how
larger groups of sockpuppets function may reveal additional ways
in which sockpuppets may coordinate, and may allow us to observe
more pronounced effects of sockpuppetry. Further, behavior of
sockpuppets in knowledge sharing platforms (e.g., StackOverflow)
may be different from that in opinion expressing discussion plat-
forms we studied – for instance, the primary purpose of sockpup-
pets in such platforms may primarily be to give additional ‘upvotes’
to their answers. Such a study would bring additional insights into
sockpuppetry. Furthermore, prior work found that trolling corre-
lates with sadism [7] – understanding the role of personality traits
in sockpuppetry would also be valuable future work. Finally, even
more robust methodologies for identifying sockpuppets may un-
cover an even wider range of behavior. For example, sockpuppets
may exist beyond a single discussion community – for example, we
found 14 different sockpuppet groups that were used in more than
one online community. Studying these types of sockpuppets may
allow us to better characterize how a sockpuppet’s behavior may
change in different communities.
By developing better techniques to identify sockpuppets, our work
can be used to improve the quality of discussions online, where
each discussant can better trust that their interactions with others
are genuine. Nonetheless, while it is possible to identify sockpup-
petry, one should be careful not to assume that all sockpuppets are
malicious. Our work suggests that a significant number of sock-
puppets do not pretend to be other users and were simply used to
participate in different discussions. This observation suggests that
some users find it valuable to separate their activity in different
spheres of interests.
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